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EDITORIAL REMARKS
REMARKS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH
THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS MAY BE USED TO
INTERPRET OR SUPPLEMENT ARTICLE
29 OF THE CISG
Sieg Eiselen*
a. Article 29 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)' deals with the require-
ments for the modification and termination of contracts. It fur-
ther encompasses the principles of party autonomy, freedom of
contract, and freedom from formalities contained in Article 11
of the CISG.2 These principles also form the foundation of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) Principles of International Commercial Con-
* Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of South Africa; Advo-
cate of the High Court of South Africa.
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, reprinted in [1980] XI UNCITRAL Yearbook 149,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/cha
pterX/treatyl7.asp [hereinafter CISGI.
2 See Franco Ferrari, Art 7, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-
KAUFRECHT - CISG RN 48, at 133 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2000). See also Ulrich
Magnus, Art 7, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT EINFUHRUNG-
SGESETZ UND NEBENGESETXEN: WIENER KAUFRECHT (CISG) Rn 42 (Michael Marti-
nek ed., 1999); Ulrich Magnus, Art 29, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETXEN: WIENER KAUFRECHT
(CISG) Rn 1, 2, 9; FABIAN BURKHART, INTERPRETATIVES ZUSAMMENWIRKEN VON
CISG UND UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 194 (2000); Martin Karollus, Art 29, in KOM-
MENTAR ZUM UN-KAUFRECHT Rn 8-10, at 315 (Heinreich Honsell ed., 1997); Hanns-
Christian Salger, Art 29, in INTERNATIONAL EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT Rn 8, at
231 (Wolfgang Witz, et al. eds., 2000); ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO THE PRACTI-
CAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 114 (1989).
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tracts,3 as expressed in Articles 1.1, 1.5, and 2.18, and therefore
should form the governing principles in the interpretation of
any contract as well as its modification or termination. 4
b. Article 2.18 of the UNIDROIT Principles in itself sheds little
light on the interpretation or augmentation of Article 29 of the
CISG, as both articles are formulated in almost exactly the
same words, with one insignificant exception. Where Article
2.18 of the UNIDROIT Principles addresses the abuse of the
written modification clause, it prohibits the reliance on such
clause "to the extent that the other party has acted in reliance
on that conduct." 5 The CISG merely refers to the extent that
the other party has "relied on that conduct."6 It is submitted
that nothing turns on this divergence, as reliance in itself im-
plies some action or failure to act on the part of that party.
c. In interpreting the scope of Article 2.18 of the UNIDROIT
Principles, regard also should be given to the provisions of Arti-
cle 3.2 that address freedom of form and formalities. In the
comments to the UNIDROIT Principles, it is stated that mere
agreement between the parties is sufficient for the valid conclu-
sion, modification, and termination of agreements without any
further requirements to be found in domestic law. 7 Specific ref-
erence is made to the fact that the requirement of consideration,
which may be applicable in common law legal systems, is ex-
cluded.8 This is in conformity with the approach taken in the
CISG.9
d. The first objective of both Article 29 of the CISG and Article
2.18 of the UNIDROIT Principles is to reinforce the principle
that any agreed modification or termination will be valid in
whatever form it is made or contained, unless the contract has a
3 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994), available at http://www.unidroit.
org/english/principles/chapter-l.htm [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
4 See id. See also T. PETZ, DIE UNIDROIT PRINZIPIEN FUR INTERNATIONALE
HANDELSVERTGRAGE 56-57 (2001); Michael Joachim Bonell, The Unidroit Princi-
ples of International Commercial Contracts: Why? What? How?, 69 TUL. L. REV.
1121, 1134-35 (1995).
5 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 3, art 2.18.
6 CISG, supra note 1, art 29(2).
7 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 3, art. 3.2.
8 See id.
9 See analysis infra paragraph d for clarification.
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provision requiring additional formalities for modification.' 0
The second objective is to eliminate an important difference in
approach between civil and common law; specifically, clearly es-
tablishing that consideration is not necessary for any amend-
ment to be valid."' However, it also addresses the time-honored
principle that where parties have, by agreement, voluntarily re-
stricted their ability to modify or terminate a contract by re-
quiring formalities for such actions, that agreement will be
valid and enforceable. 12
10 See FRITz ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW-
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 123-25 (1992), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/enderlein.html. See
also Salger, supra note 2, Rn 13, at 232; Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 1, at 312, Rn 8,
at 315; Peter Schlechtriem, Art 29, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-
KAUFRECHT - CISG Rn 3, at 305 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2000); Magus, supra note
2, at Rn 7, Rn 9; Graves Import Co. Ltd. v. Chilewich Int'l. Corp., No. 92 Civ. 3655,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13393 *13 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1994), http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/940922ul.html; Oberlandesgericht
[OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] 22 Feb. 1994 (F.R.G.), http://cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/wais/db/cases2/940222gl.html. (In this German case, the court held that al-
though a termination could not be construed from silence or inaction in itself, si-
lence or inaction in conjunction with other factors may provide sufficient evidence
of an acceptance of an offer of termination. It is suggested that this also holds true
for modifications.); Obergericht [OG] [Canton Appellate Court] 5 Oct. 1999
(Switz.), http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/991005sl.html (The principle was discussed
but the court found that on the facts an amendment had not been proven.);
N.V.A.R. v. N.V.I., [Hof van Beroep, Gent] [Appellate Court] 17 May 2002 (Belg.),
http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/020517bl.html, also available at http:/
/www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/int/tradelaw/WK/2002-05-17.htm (where failure of the
one party to respond to the letter of another was interpreted as constituting an
acceptance of the amendment offered by the other party).
11 See Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft of the UNCITRAL Art. 27,
[1978], U.N. Doc.A/CONF.97/5, reprinted in JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 418 (1989), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-29.html. See also John E.
Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters under
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8
J.L. & COM. 11 (1988), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/murray29.html (ex-
cerpt of the article); Shuttle Packaging Sys. L.L.C., v. Tosnakis, No. 1:01-CV-691,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *21 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001), http:l/
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/011217ul.html; Hides Case (Yugoslavia v.
Italy), Int'l Comm. Arb. 7331 (ICC 1994), http://cisg.law.paee.edu/cisg/wais/db/
cases2/94733 lil.html.
12 See Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 1, at 312, Rn 9, at 315, Rn 11, at 316. See
also Salger, supra note 2, Rn 13-14, at 232; Magnus, supra note 2, Rn 7, Rn 9;
Graves Import Co. Ltd., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13393, at *13 n2 (Chilewich's argu-
ment that parties had orally agreed to modify is without merit because paragraph
13 of the USSR contract No.32-03/93085 required amendments and additions to
3
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e. The commentary to Article 2.18 of the UNIDROIT Principles
makes it clear that the second objective of the article is gener-
ally to render oral modifications or terminations void where
parties have prescribed formalities, thereby rejecting the idea
that such modification or termination may be viewed as an im-
plied abrogation of the written modification or termination
clause. 13 This approach confirms the same interpretative con-
clusion reached by Schlechtriem regarding Article 29 of the
CISG. 14
f. Both Article 29 of the CISG and Article 2.18 of the
UNIDROIT Principles seem to apply only where the modifica-
tion or restriction clause is contained in a "written agree-
ment."15  In interpreting what constitutes a "written
agreement," the UNIDROIT Principles may be helpful since Ar-
ticle 13 of the CISG only extends the concept of writing to tele-
grams and telexes. Article 1.10 of the UNIDROIT Principles
extends the meaning of "written" to "any mode of communica-
tion that preserves a record of the information contained
therein and is capable of being reproduced in tangible form."1 6
It generally is recognized that Article 13 of the CISG contains a
gap since it only refers to older forms of technology and does not
provide for more modern forms of electronic communications
such as e-mail, fax, or internet communications.' 7 It is sug-
gested that the meaning of "written" should be extended to in-
clude these forms of communications in accordance with the
definition contained in Article 1.10 of the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples.18 Extending the definition has the advantage of being
the previous contract to be in writing and the CISG respects the parties' express
intent to require modifications in writing).
13 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 3, art. 2.18.
14 See Schlechtriem, supra note 10, Rn 5, at 307. See also Salger, supra note
2, Rn 5, at 230; Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 15, at 317-18; Magnus, supra note 2, Rn
12.
15 See Schlechtriem, supra note 10, Rn 9, at 308. See also Karollus, supra
note 2, Rn 12, at 316.
16 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 3, art. 1.10.
17 See generally Siegfried Eiselen, Electronic Commerce and the UN Conven-
tion on Contracts for The International Sale of Goods (CISG) 1980, 6 EDI L. REV
21, 21-46 (1999), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eiselenl.html. See also
Peter Schlechtriem, Art 13, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT -
CISG Rn 2, at 166 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2000); Magnus supra note 2, Rn 13.
18 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 141 (3d ed., 1999). See also Eiselen, supra note
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clear, practical, and technologically neutral, without losing
sight of the object of the written formality, namely preserving
an objective reproducible record of the communication between
the parties.
g. Merger clauses are not addressed within these remarks as
they more appropriately are covered under Article 8 of the
CISG, which addresses the interpretation and proof of
agreements. 19
h. The exception created in Article 29(2) of the CISG is one area
where the application of Article 29 may lead to interpretational
difficulties. 20 The rule is based on principles contained in the
so-called "Mifbrauchseinwand" of German law, the "nemo suum
venire contra factum proprium" principle of Roman law, or the
doctrine of waiver and estoppel of Anglo-American law.21
17, at 21. But see Schlechtriem, supra note 17, Rn 2, at 166 (offering a contrary
view on electronic communications). See also Ulrich G. Schroeter, Editorial Re-
marks on the Manner in Which the Principles of European Contract Law may be
used to Interpret or Supplement CISG Article 13, at http://cisg.law.pace.educisgl
text/peclcoml3.html#er (providing additional relevant discussion on Article 13 of
the CISG).
19 See Joseph M. Perillo, Editorial Remarks on CISG Article 8, at http:/!
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/principles/uni8.html#edrem.
20 See Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 17, at 318, Rn 18-19, at 319, Rn 20, at 320,
Rn 21-23, at 321 (discussing the exception created in Article 29(2) of the CISG).
See also Robert A. Hillman, Article 29(2) of the United States Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal
Effect of "No Oral Modification" Clauses, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 449, 458, 460, 465
(1988), httpJ/www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hillman2.html. In the case law,
the exception has been mentioned but denied in cases where there was a lack of
any evidence showing reliance. See Vital Berry Mktg. v. Dira-Frost [Rechtbank
van koophandel Hasselt] [District Court] 2 May 1995 (Belg.), http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950502b1.html. But see FOB Rostock
Case (Aus. v. F.R.G.) Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der
gewerblichen Wirtschaft SCH 4318 (Vienna Arb. Trib. 1994), http:l!
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cisg/wais/db/cases2/940615a4.html (the arbitrator did apply
the exception relying on the principle of estoppel).
21 See Schlechtriem, supra note 10, Rn 10 and n. 40, at 308. See also HON-
NOLD, supra note 18, at 231 n.6; Salger, supra note 2, Rn 16, at 233; KRITZER, supra
note 2, at 222; Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 18-19, at 319; ENDERLEIN & MASKOW,
supra note 10, at 125; FOB Rostock Case (Aus. v F.R.G.) Internationales Schied-
sgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft SCH 4318 (Vienna Arb.
Trib. 1994), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisglwais/db/cases2/940615a4.html, 5.4.
These principles are also supported by the principle of bona fides contained in Arti-
cle 7 of the CISG. See Dulces Luisi S.A. de C.V. v. Seoul Int'l. Co. Ltd., (Mex. v. S.
Korea) Compromex M/115/97 (Mex Comm'n for the Protection of Foreign Trade 30
Nov. 1998), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/981130m1.html.
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i. The illustrations contained in the comments to Article 2.18 of
the UNIDROIT Principles may be helpful in the interpretation
of Article 29 of the CISG.22 However, it may be asked whether
the comments call for a further requirement not contained in
Article 2.18 of the UNIDROIT Principles; specifically, whether
the reliance must be reasonable under the circumstances. 23 It
would seem that this requirement is justified, especially when
viewed in the light of the principle of good faith. Where reliance
is not reasonable under the circumstances, a party should not
be allowed to use the defense contained in Article 29(2).24
j. Neither the CISG nor the UNIDROIT Principles makes pro-
vision for the case where the parties have agreed to further for-
malities such as signature or witnesses for an amendment or
termination. 25 Therefore, the abuse exception contained in Ar-
ticle 29(2) of the CISG and Article 2.18 of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples would be in accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of
the CISG and Article 2.18 of the UNIDROIT Principles, if the
parties were bound to the formalities and terminations or modi-
fications that are non-complying. 26
22 See Schlechtriem, supra note 10, Rn 10, at 309. For further clarification,
see the examples mentioned by Schlechtriem. See also HONNOLD, supra note 18, at
231 (discussing and providing examples of interpretations of Article 20 of the
CISG); Salger, supra note 2, Rn 16, at 233, Rn 18, at 234; Karollus, supra note 2,
Rn 18-19, at 319.
23 See Landgericht Monchengladbach [LG] [District Court] 22 May 1992
(F.R.G.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/920522g1.html. The court
states that when receiving a document such as an expert's opinion rendered on
behalf of the other party, the latter should be held bound to that document as a
declaration of will if the party receiving it should have understood it as such and in
fact understood it as such, looking at it objectively. Id.
24 See Magnus, supra note 2, Rn 17. See also Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 20, at
320; Salger, supra note 2, Rn 17, at 233 (discussing the necessity of applying the
exception with flexibility); Albert H. Kritzer ed., Reasonableness, at http:ll
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/reason.html.
25 See Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 14, at 317.
26 See ENDERLEIN & MASKow, supra note 10, at 124. See HONNOLD, supra
note 18, at 230. But see Karollus, supra note 2, Rn 14, at 317 (explaining a con-
trary view in which the author argues that, unless there is a clear indication that
the parties indeed insisted on stricter formalities, there should be no presumption
that the parties required such strict compliance).
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